Data collected nowadays by social-networking applications create fascinating opportunities for building novel services, as well as expanding our understanding about social structures and their dynamics. Unfortunately, publishing socialnetwork graphs is considered an ill-advised practice due to privacy concerns. To alleviate this problem, several anonymization methods have been proposed, aiming at reducing the risk of a privacy breach on the published data, while still allowing to analyze them and draw relevant conclusions.
INTRODUCTION
Preserving the anonymity of individuals when publishing social-network data is a challenging problem that has recently attracted a lot of attention [2, 22] . The methods that have been proposed so far for anonymizing social graphs can be classified into three main categories: (1) methods that group vertices into super-vertices of size at least k, where k is the required level of anonymity; (2) methods that provide anonymity in the graph via deterministic edge additions or deletions; and (3) methods that add noise to the data in the form of random additions, deletions or switching of edges.
In this paper we introduce a new graph-anonymization method that does not fall in any of the above three categories. Our method injects uncertainty in the existence of the edges of the graph and publishes the resulting uncertain graph, that is, a graph where each edge e has an associated probability p(e) of being present. Injecting a limited amount of uncertainty in the data, in order to reach a desired level of identity obfuscation, is a natural approach [1] . For instance, the k-anonymity framework for relational data [25, 28] is typically based on injecting uncertainty by means of attribute generalization; for example, generalizing an exact numerical value to a range of values.
In the context of graph anonymization, our approach can be seen as a generalization of random-perturbation methods, which randomly delete existing edges and add non-existing edges [12] . From a probabilistic perspective, adding a nonexisting edge e corresponds to changing its probability p(e) from 0 to 1, while removing an existing edge corresponds to changing its probability from 1 to 0. In our method, instead of considering only binary edge probabilities, we allow probabilities to take any value in [0, 1], thus allowing for greater flexibility. The underlying intuition is that by using finergrained perturbation operations, one can achieve the same desired level of obfuscation with smaller changes in the data, thus maintaining higher data utility.
An example of the proposed obfuscation method is shown in Figure 1 : The graph (a) is the original graph that needs to be obfuscated; the published graph (b) is a possible obfuscation. While vertices v1 and v2 are connected in (a), in (b) they are connected with probability p(v1, v2) = 0.7, representing a reduction of 0.3 in the certainty of existence of the edge (v1, v2). Vertices v3 and v4, which are connected in (a), are no longer connected in the published graph (b), i.e., p(v3, v4) = 0. Vertices v2 and v3, which were not connected in (a), are connected with probability 0.8 in (b), corresponding to a partial creation of an edge.
A natural question that arises is how to query and analyze data that is published in the form of an uncertain graph. Hence, in order to prove the practical relevance of our proposal, not only we need to show that the uncertain graph maintains high utility, which we measure as similarity to the original graph in terms of characteristic properties, but also that the computation of these properties can be carried out efficiently. An essential part of our discussion will be devoted to this. Fortunately, an increasing research effort was dedicated in recent years to the topic of querying and mining uncertain graphs [14, 15, 24, 36, 37, 38] : this body of research comes to our aid, providing evidence that useful analysis can be carried out on uncertain graphs.
In this work we achieve the following contributions:
• We introduce and formalize the idea of injecting uncertainty in graphs for identity obfuscation. In particular, we formally define the notion of (k, ε)-obfuscation for uncertain graphs (Section 3). • We provide methods for assessing the level of obfuscation achieved by an uncertain graph with regards to the degree property (Section 4). • We introduce our method for injecting uncertainty in a graph for (k, ε)-obfuscation (Section 5). • In Section 6, we discuss several graph statistics and methods to compute them efficiently in uncertain graphs. These statistics are then used in Section 7 to assess the utility of the published uncertain graph. • Our experimental assessment on three large real-world networks proves that at the same obfuscation levels, our method maintains higher data utility than existing random-perturbation methods. In the next section we review the relevant literature, while in Section 8 we conclude the paper and suggest future work.
RELATED WORK
As we already mentioned, methods for anonymizing social networks can be broadly classified into three categories: generalization by means of clustering of vertices; deterministic alteration of the graph by edge additions or deletions; randomized alteration of the graph by addition, deletion or switching of edges.
In the first category, Hay et al. [10, 11] propose to generalize a network by clustering vertices and publishing the number of vertices in each partition together with the densities of edges within and across partitions. Campan and Truta [5] study the case in which vertices contain additional attributes, e.g., demographic information. They propose to cluster the vertices and reveal only the number of intra-and inter-cluster edges. The vertex properties are generalized in such a way that all vertices in the same cluster have the same generalized representation. Tassa and Cohen [29] consider a similar setting and propose a sequential clustering algorithm that issues anonymized graphs with higher utility than those issued by the algorithm of Campan and Truta.
Cormode et al. [7, 8] consider a framework where two sets of entities (e.g., patients and drugs) are connected by links (e.g., which patient takes which drugs), and each entity is also described by a set of attributes. The adversary relies upon knowledge of attributes rather than graph structure in devising a matching attack. To prevent matching attacks, their technique masks the mapping between vertices in the graph and real-world entities by clustering the vertices and the corresponding entities into groups. Zheleva and Getoor [33] consider the case where there are multiple types of edges, one of which is sensitive and should be protected. It is assumed that the network is published without the sensitive edges and the adversary predicts sensitive edges based on the observed non-sensitive edges.
In the second category of methods, Liu and Terzi [19] consider the case that a vertex can be identified by its degree. Their algorithms use edge additions and deletions in order to make the graph k-degree anonymous, meaning that for every vertex there are at least k − 1 other vertices with the same degree.
Zhou and Pei [34] consider the case that a vertex can be identified by its radius-one induced subgraph. Adversarial knowledge stronger than the degree is also considered by Thompson and Yao [30] , who assume that the adversary knows the degrees of the neighbors, the degrees of the neighbors of the neighbors, and so forth. Zou et al. [35] and Wu et al. [31] assume that the adversary knows the complete graph, and the location of the vertex in the graph; hence, the adversary can always identify a vertex in any copy of the graph, unless the graph has other vertices that are automorphically-equivalent.
In the last category of methods, Hay et al. [12] study the effectiveness of random perturbations for identity obfuscation. They concentrate on degree-based re-identification of vertices. Given a vertex v in the real network, they quantify the level of anonymity that is provided for v by the perturbed graph as (maxu{Pr(v | u)}) −1 , where the maximum is taken over all vertices u in the released graph and Pr(v | u) stands for the belief probability that u is the image of the target vertex v. By performing experimentation on the Enron dataset, using various values for the number h of added and removed edges, they conclude that in order to achieve a meaningful level of anonymity for the vertices in the graph, h has to be tuned so high that the resulting features of the perturbed graph no longer reflect those of the original graph.
Ying et al. [32] compare random-perturbation methods to the method of k-degree anonymity [19] . They too use the a-posteriori belief probabilities to quantify the level of anonymity. Based on experimentation on two modestlysized datasets (Enron and Polblogs) they conclude that the deterministic approach for k-degree anonymity preserves the graph structure better than random-perturbation methods.
In a more recent study, Bonchi et al. [4] take a different approach, by considering the entropy of the a-posteriori belief probability distributions as a measure of identity obfuscation. The rationale is that while using the a-posteriori belief probabilities is a local measure, the entropy is a global measure that examines the entire distribution of these belief probabilities. Bonchi et al. show that the entropy measure is more accurate than the a-posteriori belief probability, in the sense that the former distinguishes between situations that the latter perceives as equivalent. Moreover, the obfuscation level quantified by means of the entropy is always greater than the one based on a-posteriori belief probabilities. Finally, by means of a thorough experimentation on three large datasets, using several graph statistics and comparing also to Liu and Terzi [19] , they demonstrate that random perturbation could be used to achieve meaningful levels of obfuscation while preserving most of the features of the original graph.
OBFUSCATION BY UNCERTAINTY
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph, where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. We write V2 to denote the set of all n 2 unordered pairs of vertices from V , that is,
The goal is to anonymize the graph G so that the identity of its vertices is obfuscated. We propose to publish G as an uncertain graphG = (V, p), formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. Given a graph G = (V, E), an uncertain graph on the vertices of G is a pairG = (V, p), where p : V2 → [0, 1] is a function that assigns probabilities to unordered pairs of vertices.
The original graph G and the uncertain graphG have the same set of vertices V . For the sake of clarity, we write v ∈ G when we speak about a vertex in G, and v ∈G when we speak about a vertex inG.
Since the mere description of an uncertain graph consists of |V2| = n(n − 1)/2 probability values, we propose to inject uncertainty only to a small subset of pairs of vertices. Namely, given a graph G, we create a subset EC ⊆ V2 of candidate edges, and then we inject uncertainty only to the pairs of vertices in EC, while we implicitly assume that p(u, v) = 0 for all (u, v) ∈ EC. The size of EC will be set so that |EC| = c|E|, for a small constant c > 1. In Section 5 we describe a strategy for selecting EC, given G and a user-defined parameter c.
The uncertain graphG induces a collection of possible worlds W(G). A possible world W ∈ W(G) is a graph W = (V, EW ), where EW ⊆ EC. The edge probabilities in the uncertain graphG imply that the probability of W is
(1)
Let us consider the knowledge that an adversary may extract from such an uncertain graph about a given target vertex in G. Following the literature, we assume that the adversary knows some vertex property P of his target vertex [4, 12, 19, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35] . Examples of such properties, as discussed in Section 2, are the degree, the degrees of the vertex and its neighbors, and the neighborhood subgraph induced by the target vertex and its neighbors.
Let ΩP be the domain in which P takes values, e.g., if P is the degree property then ΩP = {0, . . . , n − 1}. Given an uncertain graphG and a property P , for each v ∈G and ω ∈ ΩP we define the probability Xv(ω) that v originated from a vertex in G with property value ω. Specifically,
where Pr(W ) is given in Equation (1), and χv,ω(W ) is a 0-1 variable that indicates if the vertex v has the property value ω in the possible world W . In other words, Xv(ω) is the sum of probabilities of all possible worlds in which the vertex v has the given property value ω.
The probabilities Xv(ω) may be arranged in a n×|ΩP | matrix, where each row corresponds to one vertex v ∈G and it gives the corresponding probability distribution Xv(ω) over all possible values ω ∈ ΩP . The columns of that matrix are proportional to the probability distributions that correspond to property values. More precisely, the normalized column corresponding to property ω ∈ ΩP , i.e.,
is the probability that v is the image inG of a vertex that had the property ω in G. Figure 1 (b) and the degree property.
Example 1. Consider the uncertain graph in Figure 1 (b) and assume property P1. Table 1 gives the corresponding matrix Xv(ω), in which each row gives the probability distribution regarding the degree of the corresponding vertex in G. For instance, the probability that v1 has degree 2 is 0.7·0.9·(1−0.8)+0.7·(1−0.9)·0.8+(1−0.7)·0.8·0.7 = 0.398.
The columns of Xv(ω), after normalizing them, give the corresponding Yω(v) distributions for each value of the degree (shown also in Table 1 ). For instance, if we look for a vertex that has degree 3 in G, it is either v1, with probability 0.9, or v2, with probability 0.1.
To further stress the difference between the two probability distributions, Xv(ω) and Yω(v), let us consider an uncertain graphG in which all edge probabilities are either 0 or 1 (i.e., a certain graph). Let ω be some property value in ΩP and assume that P −1 (ω) = {vi 1 , . . . , vi k } (namely, there are exactly k vertices with the property ω in the graph). Then, for all v ∈ P −1 (ω), Xv(ω) = 1 (since each of them has the property ω with certainty) and Xv(ω ′ ) = 0 for any other property ω ′ = ω (since any vertex can have in any certain graph just one property). Furthermore, Xv(ω) = 0 for all v / ∈ P −1 (ω). Let us now turn to consider the column in the matrix that corresponds to ω. Then Yω(v) = 1/k for each of the k vertices in P −1 (ω) and Yω(v) = 0 for all other vertices since if we look for a specific vertex in the graph with property ω and that is the only information that we know about that sought-after vertex, then it can be any one of the vertices in P −1 (ω) with probability 1/k.
We are ready to define our notion of privacy.
Definition 2 ((k, ε)-Obfuscation). Let P be a vertex property, k ≥ 1 be a desired level of obfuscation, and ε ≥ 0 be a tolerance parameter. The uncertain graphG is said to k-obfuscate a given vertex v ∈ G with respect to P if the entropy of the distribution Y P (v) over the vertices ofG is greater than or equal to log 2 k:
The uncertain graphG is a (k, ε)-obfuscation with respect to property P if it k-obfuscates at least (1 − ε)n vertices in G with respect to P .
Namely, given the considered attack scenario, in which the adversary uses a background knowledge of property P of his target vertex, we wish to lower bound the entropy of the distribution it induces over the obfuscated graph vertices by log 2 k (in similarity to the privacy goal in k-anonymity). As for the tolerance parameter ε, it serves the following purpose. Considering the fact that degree sequences in typical social networks have very skewed distribution, trying to obfuscate some very unique vertices (such as Barack Obama or CNN in twitter or Facebook) is on the one hand hopeless, and on the other hand not necessarily needed: these vertices do not represent "normal" users, and identifying them does not disclose anyone's personal information. In fact, as we will see later, our obfuscation algorithm guarantees that the ε-fraction of vertices for which the privacy requirement is not satisfied can be forced to be taken from some specific sub-population; for example, in the case of degree obfuscation they are vertices with high degree.
Example 2. Consider again the graph in Figure 1 . Vertex v1 has degree 3 in the original graph. Thus, in order to check the level of obfuscation of this vertex in the obfuscated graph we have to measure the entropy of the column deg = 3 of Table Yω (v). That entropy is approximately 0.469, which is rather low, meaning that the identity of v1 is not obfuscated enough in the uncertain graph in Figure 1 (b). Vertex v2 has degree 1 in the original graph. The entropy of the column deg = 1 is ≈ 1.688 > log 2 3. Vertices v3 and v4 have degree 2, and the entropy of the corresponding column is ≈ 1.742 ≥ log 2 3. Therefore, as three out of four vertices are 3-obfuscated, the graph in Figure 1 
QUANTIFYING THE OBFUSCATION
In this section we describe how to compute the level of obfuscation with regard to the degree property. When P is the degree, ΩP = {0, . . . , n − 1}, and, consequently, the matrix has n rows and n columns. We need to describe how to compute Xv(ω) for all v ∈G and ω ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Once the full matrix Xv is given, it is possible to derive the distributions Yω over the vertices ofG for all ω ∈ P (G) and then verify the k-obfuscation property.
Fix v ∈G and let e1, . . . , en−1 be the n−1 pairs of vertices that include v. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, ei is a Bernoulli random variable that equals 1 with some probability pi. Letting dv be the random variable corresponding to the degree of v, we have
Then for each possible degree ω ∈ ΩP of v, we have Xv(ω) = Pr(dv = ω).
Lemma 1. The probability distribution of dv may be computed exactly in time O(n 2 ).
ei denote the partial sum of the first ℓ Bernoulli random variables. We will show that once we have the distribution of
Therefore, computing a single probability in the distribution of It should be noted that since we choose to inject uncertainty only to a subset EC of pairs of vertices, the sum in Equation (4) is taken only over the pairs of vertices in EC that include the vertex v. Hence, if d is the average degree in G, the average number of addends in dv is dc, where c = |EC|/|E|.
In cases where the sum in Equation (4) has a large number of addends, we may adopt an alternative approach. Since dv is the sum of independent random variables, it may be approximated by the normal distribution N (µ,
as implied by the Central Limit Theorem [16] . (The Central Limit Theorem becomes effective already for n ≈ 30; for typical sizes of n in social networks, the normal approximation becomes very accurate.) Specifically,
INJECTING UNCERTAINTY
In this section we describe our algorithm, which, given a graph G, a desired level of obfuscation k, and a tolerance parameter ε, injects a minimal level of uncertainty to the graph so that it becomes (k, ε)-obfuscated with respect to a vertex property P .
Overview
As discussed in Section 3, we inject uncertainty in the graph by assigning probabilities to a subset EC ⊆ V2 of pairs of vertices, such that |EC| = c|E|, for a small constant parameter c. The selection of EC is described in a subsequent section. Once EC is selected, only the pairs e ∈ EC will become uncertain edges inG. All other pairs e / ∈ EC will be certain non-edges, i.e., p(e) = 0. To establish the uncertainty of each pair e ∈ EC, we select a random perturbation re ∈ [0, 1]. If e ∈ E, it becomes an uncertain edge iñ G with probability p(e) = 1 − re; if e ∈ EC \ E, it becomes an uncertain edge with probability p(e) = re.
In order for the uncertain graphG to preserve the characteristics of the original graph G, smaller values of the perturbation parameter re should be favored. A natural candidate for the generating distribution of re is the [0, 1]-truncated normal distribution,
where Φµ,σ is the density function of a Gaussian distribution provided in Equation (5). As the standard deviation σ of the normal distribution decreases, a greater mass of Rσ will concentrate near r = 0 and then the amount of injected uncertainty will be smaller. Thus, small values of σ contribute towards better maintaining the characteristics of the original graph, but at the same time they provide lower levels of obfuscation. Larger values of σ have the opposite effect.
A key feature of our method is to select judiciously the perturbation re for each pair e = (u, v) ∈ EC, depending on properties of the vertices u and v. Hence, the random variable re is drawn from R σ(e) , where the parameter σ(e) depends on the vertices that e connects. The perturbation will be larger for edges that connect more unique vertices, which, consequently, require higher levels of uncertainty to "blend in the crowd," and smaller for edges that connect more "typical" vertices.
Additionally, in order to prevent identifying pairs e ∈ EC that are true edges in G (by turning every pair e ∈ EC to an edge if p(e) ≥ 0.5 and to a non-edge otherwise), the perturbation re is drawn from the uniform distribution in [0, 1], rather than from the distribution Rσ, for a q-fraction of the pairs e ∈ EC, with 0 < q ≪ 1.
Uniqueness Scores of Vertices
For certain properties of interest, such as degree, the majority of vertices in real-world graphs are already anonymous even without random perturbations. The reason is that for most values of the property P there are many vertices that have that value. Hence, we aim at controlling the amount of applied perturbation, so that larger perturbation is added at vertices that are less anonymized in the original graph. In particular, we suggest to calibrate the perturbation applied to a pair e = (u, v) ∈ EC according to the "uniqueness" of the two vertices u and v with respect to the property P . Namely, if both P (u) and P (v) are frequent values, then re should be very small; on the other hand, if P (u) and P (v) are outlier values, then re should be higher. We proceed to explain our method in detail.
Let P : V → ΩP be a property defined on the set of vertices V . Further, consider a distance function d between values in the range ΩP of P . So, for each pair of values, ω, ω ′ ∈ ΩP , a distance d(ω, ω ′ ) ≥ 0 is defined. For example, for the degree property P1, the distance d is the modulus of the difference of two degrees, while for the radius-one subgraph property (P3), the distance d is the edit distance between two subgraphs.
Definition 3. Let P : V → ΩP be a property on the set of vertices V of the graph G, let d be a distance function on ΩP , and let θ > 0 be a parameter. Then the θcommonness of the property value ω ∈ ΩP is C θ (ω) := v∈V Φ 0,θ (d(w, P (v))), while the θ-uniqueness of ω ∈ ΩP is U θ (ω) := 1 C θ (ω) . In the above definition the function Φ is the Gaussian distribution given by Equation (5) . The commonness of the property value ω is a measure of how typical is the value ω among the vertices of the graph. It is obtained as a weighted average over all other property values ω ′ , where the weight decays exponentially as a function of the distance between ω and ω ′ . The uniqueness is the inverse of the commonness. It should be noted that the commonness and uniqueness are meaningful only as relative measures, as they allow to assess how one property value is more common, or more unique, in G than another property value.
Commonness and uniqueness scores depend on the parameter θ, which determines the decay rate of the average weights as a function of the distance. We set θ = σ as larger amounts of uncertainty imply that property values may be spread on larger domains of ΩP due to injecting uncertainty.
The Obfuscation Algorithm
Our algorithm for computing a (k, ε)-obfuscation of a graph with respect to a vertex property P is outlined as Algorithm 1. Targeting for high utility, the algorithm aims at injecting the minimal amount of uncertainty needed to achieve the required obfuscation. Computing the minimal Algorithm 1 (k, ε)-obfuscation Input: G = (V, E), vertex property P , obfuscation level k, tolerance ε, size multiplier c, and white noise level q. Output: A (k, ε)-obfuscationG of G with respect to P .
1: σ ℓ ← 0 2: σu ← 1 3: repeat 4: ε,G ← GenerateObfuscation(G, σu, P, k, ε, c, q) 5: ifε = ∞ then σu ← 2σu 6: untilε = ∞ 7:G f ound ←G 8: while σ ℓ + δ < σu do 9:
σ ← (σ ℓ + σu)/2 10: ε,G ← GenerateObfuscation(G, σu, P, k, ε, c, q) 11: ifε = ∞ then σ ℓ ← σ 12: elseG f ound ←G; σu ← σ 13: returnG f ound amount of uncertainty is achieved via a binary search on the value of the uncertainty parameter σ.
The binary-search flow of Algorithm 1 is determined by the function GenerateObfuscation, which is shown as Algorithm 2. The function GenerateObfuscation returns a pair ε,G whereε = ∞ or 0 ≤ε ≤ ε. In the first case, the function could not find a (k, ε)-obfuscation with the given uncertainty parameter. In the latter case,G is a (k,ε)-obfuscation of G with respect to P , and thus, also a (k, ε)-obfuscation.
The obfuscation algorithm starts with an initial guess of an upper bound σu, which is iteratively doubled until a (k, ε)-obfuscated graph is found. Then, the binary-search process is performed using σ ℓ = 0 as the lower bound, and the upper bound σu that was found. The binary search terminates when the search interval is sufficiently short, and the algorithm outputs the best (k, ε)-obfuscation found (i.e., the last one that was successfully generated, because it will be the one obtained with the smallest σ).
The function GenerateObfuscation (Algorithm 2) aims at finding a (k, ε)-obfuscation of G using a given standard deviation parameter σ. First, it computes the σ-uniqueness level Uσ(P (v)) for each vertex v ∈ G. The more unique a vertex is, the harder it is to obfuscate it. Hence, in order to use the "uncertainty budget" σ in the most efficient way, the algorithm performs the following two pre-processing steps.
(Line 2): Since it is allowed not to obfuscate ε|V | of the vertices, the algorithm selects the set H of ⌈ ε 2 |V |⌉ vertices with largest uniqueness scores, which are the vertices that would require the largest amount of uncertainty, and excludes them from the subsequent obfuscation efforts. In later steps, the algorithm will inject uncertainty only to edges that are not adjacent to any of the vertices in H. (The algorithm could also receive H, or part of H, as an input, instead of fully selecting it on its own.) (Line 3): The set of vertices not in H will need to be obfuscated. To obfuscate more unique vertices, higher uncertainty is necessary. Thus, edges need to be sampled with higher probability if they are adjacent to unique vertices. In order to handle this sampling process, our algorithm assigns a probability Q(v) to every v ∈ V , which is proportional to the uniqueness level Uσ(P (v)) of v.
After that, the search for a (k, ε)-obfuscation starts: since the algorithm is randomized and there is a non-zero prob-Algorithm 2 GenerateObfuscation Input: G = (V, E), P, k, ε, c, q, and standard deviation σ. Output: A pair ε,G , whereG is a (k,ε)-obfuscation (with ε < ε), orε = ∞ if a (k, ε)-obfuscation was not found.
1: for all v ∈ V compute the σ-uniqueness Uσ(P (v)) 2: H ← the set of ⌈ ε 2 |V |⌉ vertices with largest Uσ(P (v)) 3: for all v ∈ V do Q(v) ← Uσ(P (v))/ u∈V Uσ(P (u)) 4:ε ← ∞ 5: for t times do 6:
EC ← E 7:
repeat 8:
randomly pick a vertex u ∈ V \ H according to Q 9:
randomly pick a vertex v ∈ V \ H according to Q 10:
if
until |EC| = c|E| 13:
for all e ∈ EC do 14:
compute σ(e) 15:
draw w uniformly at random from [0, 1] 16:
if w < q 17:
then draw re uniformly at random from [0, 1] 18:
else draw re from the random distribution R σ(e) 19 :
if e ∈ E then p(e) ← 1 − re else p(e) ← re 20:
if ε ′ ≤ ε and ε ′ <ε thenε ← ε ′ ;G ← G ′ 22: return ε,G ability of failure, t attempts to find a (k, ε)-obfuscation are performed (Lines 5-22; in our experiments we used t = 5).
Each attempt begins by randomly selecting a subset EC ⊆ V2, which will be subjected to uncertainty injection (Lines 6-12). The set EC, whose target size is |EC| = c|E|, is initialized to be E (Line 6). Then, the algorithm randomly selects two distinct vertices u and v, according to the probability distribution Q, such that none of them is in H (Lines 8-9). The pair of vertices (u, v) is removed from EC if it is an edge, or added to EC otherwise (Lines 10-11). The process is repeated until EC reaches the required size c|E|. Since in typical graphs, the number of non-edges is significantly larger than the number of edges, i.e., |E| ≪ |V2|/2, the loop in Lines 7-12 ends very quickly, for small values of c, and the resulting set EC includes most of the edges in E.
Next, in Line 14, we redistribute the uncertainty levels among all pairs e ∈ EC in proportion to their uniqueness levels. Specifically, we define for each e = (u, v) ∈ EC its σ-uniqueness level,
and then set
so that the average of σ(e) over all e ∈ EC equals σ. Given the edge uncertainty levels, σ(e), we select for each pair of vertices e ∈ EC a random perturbation re. For the majority of the pairs (an (1 − q)-fraction, where the input parameter q is small) we select re from the random distribution R σ(e) (see Equation (6)). For the remaining q-fraction of pairs we select re from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. If e is an actual edge (e ∈ E), it turns into an uncertain edge inG with associated probability of p(e) = 1 − re. If e is a non-edge in G (e ∈ EC \ E), it turns into an uncertain edge inG with probability p(e) = re (Line 19).
If the algorithm finds a (k, ε)-obfuscated graph in one of its t trials, it returns the obfuscated graph with minimal ε. If, on the other hand, all t attempts fail, the algorithm indicates the failure by returningε = ∞.
UTILITY OF THE UNCERTAIN GRAPH
In order to prove the practical relevance of our proposal, we need to show that: (1) the uncertain graph maintains high utility, i.e., it is highly similar to the original graph in terms of characteristic properties; and (2) the computation of these properties can be carried out in reasonable time.
In the rest of this section, we discuss several graph statistics and show how to compute them in uncertain graphs. In our experimental assessment, we use those statistics to evaluate the utility of the proposed graph obfuscation.
Further evidence to the usefulness of publishing an uncertain graph is provided by the many recent papers on mining and querying uncertain graphs [14, 15, 24, 36, 37, 38 ].
Sampling
Given a standard (certain) graph G, let S[G] be the value of a statistical measure S for G. Examples of such a statistical measure S are the average degree, the diameter, the clustering coefficient of G, and so on. In order to define the value of S in an uncertain graphG = (V, p), the most natural choice is to consider the expected value of S[G], namely,
where Pr(W ) is given in Equation (1). While for some statistics it is possible to compute the expected value in Equation (8) without explicitly performing a summation over the exponential number of possible worlds (as we will see in Section 6.2), for other statistics such a computation remains infeasible. Hence, we have to resort to approximation by sampling. Namely, we sample a subset of possible worlds W ′ ⊆ W(G) according to the distribution induced by the probabilities Pr(W ), and then take the average S of the statistic S in the sampled worlds as an approximation of E(S[G]):
Sampling a possible world according to the distribution Pr(W ) is carried out by sampling independently each edge e with probability p(e).
The following lemma provides a probabilistic error bound for approximating the expected value by an average over a number of sampled worlds. Lemma 2. LetG = (V, p) be an uncertain graph and assume that S is a graph statistic that satisfies a ≤ S ≤ b. Let r = |W ′ | denote the number of sampled worlds and S be the average of the statistic S over those worlds, Equation (9) . Then for every ε > 0,
Proof. Let W ′ = {Wi} 1≤i≤r be the set of r graphs that were sampled fromG = (V, p). Then Si = S[Wi], 1 ≤ i ≤ r, are independent and identically distributed random variables. Since E(Si) = E(S[G]) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, it follows that also E(S) = E(S[G]). Hence, inequality (10) follows directly from Hoeffding's inequality [13] .
Corollary 1. For given error bound ε and probability of failure δ, we have
In the next section, we define a number of scalar and vector statistics of interest; when possible, we also provide an explicit computation of E(S[G]).
Statistics Based on Degree
Let d1, . . . , dn denote the degree sequence in a graph G. The statistic S is called a degree-based statistic if S = F (d1, . . . , dn) for some function F . Examples of such statistics are:
• Number of edges:
WhenG is an uncertain graph, d1, . . . , dn are random variables. If F is a linear function, then we have
Hence, since the expected degree of a vertex v ∈ V is equal to the sum of probabilities of its adjacent edges, the computation of the expected statistic is easy, in the case of a linear function. As the first two examples above, SNE and SAd, correspond to a linear function F , we have:
and
Things are less simple when F is non-linear, since then Equation (11) does not hold. This is the case with the latter two examples -the maximal degree (F = max) and the degree variance (F is quadratic). For these statistics we adopt the sampling approach described in the previous section. Since the maximal degree is at most n−1, the statistic SMD satisfies Corollary 1 with a = 0 and b = n − 1. Similarly, the statistic SDV satisfies Corollary 1 with a = 0 and b = (n − 1) 2 . It should also be noted that we can compute E(SDV[G]) precisely. However, the cost of evaluating the corresponding formulas, which we omit herein, is quadratic in the number of vertices.
We proceed to describe two additional statistics that are based on the degree distribution. In the following we use ∆(d), with 0 ≤ d ≤ n − 1, to denote the fraction of vertices in the graph G that have degree d.
The first statistic, denoted by SPL, is the power-law exponent of the degree distribution. For this statistic, we assume that the degree distribution follows a power law, ∆(d) ∼ d −γ , and SPL is an estimate of −γ. In our experiments, we focused on higher degrees where the power law fits better, and we fitted the exponent ignoring smaller degrees.
The second statistic is the degree distribution itself, SDD := (∆(0), ∆(1), . . . , ∆(n − 1)). As opposed to all previous statistics, which were scalar, this one is a vector. In fact, each of the previous statistics may be derived from the degree distribution. To approximate SDD[G] we adopt once more the sampling approach: for every degree d, we approximate ∆(d) by the average ∆(d) obtained over the sampled possible worlds.
Statistics Based on Shortest-path Distance
Other interesting measures characterizing a graph are those based on the shortest-path distance between pairs of vertices. Computing distance distributions on large graphs is far from trivial, as explained in the survey of Kang et al. [17] . While exact solutions using breadth-first search or Floyd's algorithm are out of question, there is still no consensus in the research community on which approximate technique is best [9] . Some methods are based on sampling, for example, performing a breadth-first search from a selected set of vertices [6, 18] , and other are based on information diffusion [3, 17, 23] . While the former are simpler to implement, diffusion-based techniques have the advantage of being more general (they are natively designed for directed graphs, while most sampling methods only work for undirected ones) and scale more gracefully.
Defining the distance between pairs of vertices in uncertain graphs is not an easy task since, typically, the corresponding ensemble of possible worlds will include disconnected instances; in such disconnected possible worlds, some of the pairwise distances are infinite [24] . We directly avoid this problem by defining the distance-based measures S only on pairs of vertices that are path-connected.
We consider five measures:
• Average distance: SAPD is the average distance among all pairs of vertices that are path-connected. • Effective diameter : SEDiam is the 90-th percentile distance among all path-connected pairs of vertices, i.e., the minimal value for which 90% of the finite pairwise distances in the graph are no larger than. In our experiments, we used the variant that linearly interpolates between the 90-th percentile and the successive integer.
• Connectivity length: The statistic SCL is defined as the harmonic mean of all pairwise distances in the graph, [20] . Note that by taking is the number of pairs of vertices whose distance equals k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, and SPDD[∞] is the number of pairs of vertices that are not path-connected. • Diameter : SDiam is the maximum distance among all path-connected pairs of vertices.
For computing the above measures we rely on sampling. It is easy to see that Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 hold for each of those statistics with a = 1 and b = n − 1.
To estimate the distance distribution in a given (certain) graph, we use HyperANF [3] , a diffusion-based algorithm that provides a good tradeoff between accuracy guarantees and execution time. As the algorithm is probabilistic, the results that it gives may drift from the real ones, depending on the number of registers used for the evaluation. Such drifts affect the variance over the value obtained for each point of the distance distribution. To limit the effect of such probabilistic drifts, we repeat the execution of HyperANF and used jackknifing [26] to infer the standard error of the statistics that we compute; in our experiments this error ranges between 0.2% and 2%.
While the HyperANF approach is viable for the first four statistics described above, it falls short in estimating the diameter. Exact diameter estimation is difficult and even heuristic methods such as [9] would be too inefficient to be executed on many sampled worlds. As a result, we focus on estimating a lower bound SDiamLB for SDiam: such a lower bound is computed as the largest distance t for which the approximate distance distribution computed by HyperANF is nonzero; i.e., it is the largest distance t for which we estimate that there is at least one pair of vertices of distance t from each other.
Clustering Coefficient
The clustering coefficient SCC measures the extent to which the edges of the graph "close triangles." More formally, given a graph G, let Given an uncertain graphG, we can estimate the expected clustering coefficient E(SCC[G]) by sampling (see Section 6.1). Since the clustering coefficient takes values between 0 and 1, we can apply Lemma 2 with a = 0 and b = 1. Thus, we can estimate E(SCC[G]) within an error of at most ε and probability of success at least 1 − δ by sampling at least r = 1 2ε 2 ln( 2 δ ) possible worlds.
EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENT
The objective of our experimental assessment is to show that the proposed technique is able to provide the required obfuscation levels while maintaining high data utility. In particular, we set the following concrete subgoals. For given values of k and ε, we want to assess:
1. the level of noise (specified by the value of σ) needed to achieve (k, ε)-obfuscation; 2. the running time of the obfuscation algorithm; 3. the error in the statistics of the obfuscated graph with respect to the original graph; 4. how the proposed method compares with random-perturbation methods for the same levels of obfuscation. Dataset k ε = 10 −3 ε = 10 −4 dblp 20 5.9605 · 10 −8 1.6153 · 10 −5 60 2.9802 · 10 −7 3.2206 · 10 −3 100 1.8775 · 10 −5 1.0711 · 10 −2 flickr 20 2.2948 · 10 −5 2.6343 · 10 −2 60 1.0397 · 10 −3 7.3275 · 10 −2 (*) 100 5.8624 · 10 −3 2.9273 · 10 −1 (*) Y360 20 5.9605 · 10 −8 5.9605 · 10 −8 60 5.9605 · 10 −8 1.0133 · 10 −6 100 5.9605 · 10 −8 1.1146 · 10 −5 For our experiments, we use three large real-world datasets. dblp is a co-authorship graph extracted from a recent snapshot of the DBLP database considering only journal publications. 2 Vertices represent authors, and there is an undirected edge between two authors if they have authored a journal paper together. flickr is a popular online community for sharing photos, with millions of users. 3 In addition to many photo-sharing facilities, users are creating a social network by explicitly marking other users as their contacts.
Y360: Yahoo! 360 was a social-networking and personalcommunication portal. In the Y360 dataset, edges represents the friendship relationship among users.
The graphs sizes vary from 226 413 vertices of dblp, 588 166 of flickr, to 1 226 311 of Y360, with different densities; Y360 is the largest but also the sparsest dataset. The main statistics (as defined in Section 6) of the three datasets are reported in Table 4 .
Parameter Tuning and Running Time
In our first set of experiments, we considered three obfuscation levels, k ∈ {20, 60, 100}, and two possible tolerance values, ε ∈ {10 −3 , 10 −4 }. We experimented with different values for q and c (with q ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1} and c ∈ {2, 3}), but here we present only the case q = 0.01 and c = 2 (except for two instances that will be discussed below). In Table 2 , we report the minimal values of σ, as found by Algorithm 1, that yielded a (k, ε)-obfuscation for given values of k and ε.
As expected, larger k or smaller ε required larger values of σ, because more noise was needed in order to reach the desired level of obfuscation. In some cases, Algorithm 1 failed to find a proper upper bound for σ in the loop in Table 2 ). For every statistics, the value shown is the sample standard deviation, divided by the square root of the sample size and normalized by the sample mean. The last column is the average of the relative sample standard errors over all of the statistics. Lines 3-6. In those cases, increasing the parameter c to 3 resolved the problem. The obfuscation algorithm was implemented in Java and run on an Intel Xeon X5660 CPUs, 2.80 GHz, 12 MB cache size. Table 3 reports the running times (expressed in edges per second) of the same experiments for which we reported in Table 2 the values of σ. As explained above, we used in all cases q = 0.01 and c = 2, except for the two cases marked by ( * ) in which c = 3. We note that using smaller values of c has the benefit of keeping the graph size under control; such a benefit is of special importance for large networks. Smaller values of c also reduce the runtime of Algorithm 2, where the main loop (Lines 13-19) is over c|E| edges. This effect is evident in Table 3 , where the performance drops substantially in the two cases where c = 3. As expected, the performance slightly decreases when k increases or ε decreases, due to the increased efforts to achieve a higher obfuscation level. We note that the smaller computation times required for Y360 are due to the fact that this dataset turns out to be easier to obfuscate than the others (as witnessed also by the small final values of σ as reported in Table 2 ).
The parameter q just introduces some amount of "white noise" in the graph. Using higher values of q enhances obfuscation but it also reduces the utility of the final released graph. Due to space limitations, we present only results for q = 0.01. A more elaborated set of plots, for different settings of q and other obfuscation parameters, will be given in an extended version of this paper 4 .
Data Utility
Next, we computed statistics of interest on the obfuscated graphs, using the sampling method (Section 6.1). 5 For every obfuscated graph, we sampled 100 possible worlds and for each of them we computed all the scalar statistics listed above. The mean values obtained are shown in Table 4 . Those values are very concentrated, as witnessed by Table 5, that reports the relative sample standard error of the mean (also called SEM; it is obtained as the sample standard deviation divided by the square root of the sample size and normalized by the sample mean); the last column reports the average computed over all the statistics. As can be seen, all statistics are very well concentrated; on average, the fluctuations for all statistics are of about 3% (last column of Table 5 ), but most of them (see, for example, SNE or SAD) exhibit a much higher level of concentration. There is a weak dependence on k and also on ε (the latter dependence is not shown here).
We proceed to comparing the sample mean of the statistics obtained with their real values on the original graph (see again Table 4 ). The quality of the estimation decreases when obfuscation becomes larger: in the last column of the table, we computed the average statistical error over all scalar statistics, that is, the relative absolute difference between the estimate and the real value. With small values of k, e.g., k = 20, the error is always well below 15%; larger values of k introduce larger errors, up to 70.5% when k = 100 in the dblp dataset. Observe that some statistics (e.g., degree variance or clustering coefficient) are more affected by error than others. The behavior described for scalar statistics is also observed with vector statistics. For example, Figure 2 shows SPDD (the distribution of the pairwise distances) in the original dblp and in two obfuscated versions. Here, two extreme cases are presented: For k = 20 and ε = 10 −3 the distribution obtained is qualitatively very similar (as witnessed also by the scalar distance-based statistics in Table 4 ); conversely, for k = 100 and ε = 10 −4 , the estimated distribution is quite far from the original one. In Figure 3 we present a similar plot for the degree distribution: for every degree, we considered the distribution of the frequency of that degree across all possible worlds. In this case, the approximation is very concentrated and its mean almost coincides with the real degree frequency, even for k = 100 and ε = 10 −4 .
Comparative Evaluation
We finally compare our proposed method with randomperturbation methods that publish a standard graph (in articular the methods described by Bonchi et al. [4] ):
• random sparsification: given a parameter p, each edge e ∈ E is removed from the graph with probability p; • random perturbation: given a parameter p, first each edge e ∈ E is removed from the graph with probability p, then each non-existing edge in V2 \ E is added with probability p|E| ( |V | 2 )−|E| .
To make the comparison possible, we must first determine which value of the parameter p used in these obfuscation algorithms corresponds to which pair (k, ε) of obfuscation parameters. The appropriate values can be deduced by the anonymity level plots of the sparsified or perturbed graph obtained with a certain value of p: of course, any such graph will correspond to many pairs of parameters (k, ε); for example, given any fixed ε, an appropriate k can be determined by disregarding the εn vertices with smallest anonymity and letting k be the least anonymity of the remaining vertices. Figure 4 shows the obfuscation levels obtained for some of the parameter combinations on dblp and flickr. The plot shows, for every obfuscation level k, the number of vertices that have obfuscation level less than or equal to k. The two rectangles appearing in the plot highlight the obfuscation requirements (k, ε). Figure 4 shows, for example, Figure 4 : Comparison of the anonymity levels obtained for dblp (left) and flickr (right) using obfuscation, random perturbation and sparsification, for the parameter choices described in Section 7.3. The plot shows, for every obfuscation level k, the number of vertices that have obfuscation level less than or equal to k. • dblp with sparsification using p = 0.64, matching k = 20 and ε ≈ 10 −4 ; • flickr with random perturbation using p = 0.32 and with sparsification using p = 0.64, both corresponding to k = 20 with ε ≈ 10 −4 . For each of the two obfuscation techniques presented in [4] , we produced 50 samples; note that in those probabilistic methods, the obfuscation is a certain graph. Then we computed the statistics on each sample, and proceeded in the same way as we did for the obfuscated graph. Table 6 shows the results of the comparison. In all cases, the quality of the statistics as computed with our obfuscation method is much better; in one case, the relative error is 5% instead of the 92% imposed by sparsification to obtain the same level of obfuscation. Therefore, we can safely conclude that our experimental assessment on real-world graphs confirms the initial and driving intuition underlying One interesting research direction is to investigate how to extend our uncertainty-based approach in order to release networks with additional information, besides the mere graph data, such as vertex attributes [22] , communication logs among users, information-propagation traces, and other types of social dynamics. Another case of particular interest is that of a sequential release of a social network. In a recent paper, Medforth and Wang [21] demonstrated the risks of publishing a sequence of releases of the same network. In particular, they described the degree-trail attack, by which the vertex belonging to a target user can be re-identified from a sequence of published graphs, by comparing the degrees of the vertices in the published graphs with the degree evolution of the target. The applicability of the degree-trail attack to our probabilistic graph release is an open research question.
